Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2008 China and global development towards a Global Asian Er - § 3 references coded [ 0.60% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.08% Coverage

China’s foreign aid derives largely from four central government and a variety of provincial government agencies.

Reference 2 - 0.19% Coverage

With this multiplicity of funding sources and the diverse (indeed, given provincial involve-   
ment, competing) interests associated with them, it is probably a misreading of the situation to assume that there is a uniﬁed ‘strategy’ when it comes to China’s aid programme.

Reference 3 - 0.34% Coverage

Unlike their international counterparts, it is a matter of course, for instance, for Chinese aid agencies to refuse to engage with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) concerned with the human rights and governance implications of their policies and – to take one Chinese example – the China Export-Import Bank consistently fails to conduct environmental and social impact analyses (now routine for international aid agencies) prior to investing in given projects (Alden 2007, Ch. 1).

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2008 Giles Mohan New African Choices The Politics of Chinese Engagement - § 4 references coded [ 0.63% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.19% Coverage

It was usually given as a grant, was strictly bilateral in nature, and only given where the relationship was mutually beneficial to donor and recipient alike. Moreover, Chinese aid workers were urged not to ‘loll in hotel suites and run up expenses as other expatriates did’

Reference 2 - 0.06% Coverage

First, there is some evidence that a Chinese merchant class has emerged in some countries.

Reference 3 - 0.20% Coverage

On the face of it these merchants may be less interested in domestic political issues so long as they can accumulate wealth. This could be attractive to authoritarian African regimes (Lee, 2007), because their sojourner status means they are less likely to press for openly democratic changes.

Reference 4 - 0.19% Coverage

More recently the Chinese construction methodology is to keep Chinese workers in their own labour and social groups, within their own accommodation, and working to Chinese practices of speed and health and safety, but it is not true that all go home afterwards (Chan, 2007).

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2010 BuildingcComplementarities in Africa between Different - § 3 references coded [ 0.79% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.08% Coverage

These activities are administered by over 20 line ministries, public banks and other agencies.

Reference 2 - 0.24% Coverage

The engagement of China, on the contrary, is more business oriented and supports infrastructure projects, which are provided on a competitive basis and are finalized on time. For China long-term development of a country is, in the first instance, the responsibility of the recipient

Reference 3 - 0.47% Coverage

As indicated earlier, China has a business oriented approach in its engagement with Africa and therefore any comparison   
between the approach of traditional development partners and China should not only focus on aid modalities, such as debt relief and general budget support, but also incorporate trade and investment. In this regard, China is often cited as the third largest trading partner ofAfrica with US$95 billion in bilateral trade in 2008. China also provided US$5.4 billion of investment in Africa in the same year (see Figures 4 and 5).

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2010 Kiala ChinaAngola aid relations- strategic cooperation for development~ - § 1 reference coded [ 0.15% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.15% Coverage

The thematic focus of Chinese aid to Angola is varied. Infrastructure develop-   
ment is the main component, consisting of projects in utilities, transportation and other public works.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2010 Samy China’s Aid Policies in Africa Opportunities and - § 5 references coded [ 0.94% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.19% Coverage

China’s aid programmes have also expanded from the main traditional project-based type of the 1990s to include debt cancellation, technical co-operation, humanitarian aid and training of personnel.

Reference 2 - 0.28% Coverage

Even if the existing literature has identiﬁed costs and beneﬁts to both approaches, project lending typically allows donors to exercise more control over the allocation of aid, the design and implementation of projects, and the policies of the sectors where projects are being implemented.

Reference 3 - 0.23% Coverage

As discussed above, investments in infrastructure that had fallen out of favour   
with traditional donors but are a signiﬁcant part of Chinese aid policy are recognised by African leaders and governments as necessary and helpful for development.

Reference 4 - 0.08% Coverage

infrastructure spending be doubled in order to raise productivity and economic growth.

Reference 5 - 0.15% Coverage

Third, when detailed information is available, trade and investment opportunities provided by China are far greater than the amounts of aid to African countries.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2011 Bräutigam Aid ‘With Chinese Characteristics’ Chinese Foreig - § 4 references coded [ 1.25% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.15% Coverage

he concessional foreign aid loan programme operated by China Eximbank mixes diplomacy, development and business objectives.

Reference 2 - 0.19% Coverage

However, within the Chinese bureaucracy, China’s external assistance activities and other kinds of economic cooperation are separately ﬁnanced and organised.

Reference 3 - 0.59% Coverage

Although the DAC donors commonly ‘poach’ skilled staff from African ministries to work in their own country ofﬁces, the Chinese department of foreign aid is centralised in Beijing, and Chinese economic counsellors’ ofﬁces usually have only one or two people assigned to monitor their foreign aid. Chinese experts do not cost much, and they do continue to live at the level of their local counterparts, in simple compounds, even if many more of them accompany a Chinese project than would be the case for the DAC donors.

Reference 4 - 0.33% Coverage

In general, the Chinese—like the World Bank decades ago—simply depend on local governments to sort these things out. But as local governments do not always have good track records or experience in these matters, this can be another downside of genuine local ownership (Bräutigam, 2009).

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2012 Mawdsley The changing geographies of foreign aid and develo - § 1 reference coded [ 0.09% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.09% Coverage

The majority of South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) ﬂows, in most cases, are effectively commercial in nature, if on preferential terms

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2012 China as a net donor tracking dollars and sense - § 3 references coded [ 0.43% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.10% Coverage

China’s aid and investment has been concentrated in infrastructure, including high-proﬁle construction projects, energy development and natural resource projects

Reference 2 - 0.10% Coverage

What the above text shows is that the CCP is much more involved in framing and guiding the country’s foreign aid programmes than acknowledged to date in the scholarly literature.

Reference 3 - 0.23% Coverage

we have seen that the CCP leadership and party ofﬁcials play a key role   
in guiding and shaping China’s aid. The surging waves of Chinese aid have generated a paradoxical scenario that consists of at least three dimensions. Even as China has turned itself into a global economic power, the party leadership has wanted to maintain the nation’s self-identiﬁcation with the South, with the developing world

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2013 Brant Chinese Aid in the South Pacific Linked to Resour - § 4 references coded [ 0.87% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.24% Coverage

the majority of Chinese concessional loan funding is still directed towards infrastructure-related projects. This is not surprising given it is an area that both China and Paciﬁc Island Governments have identiﬁed as one where China can contribute, and the large size of the funding lends itself to larger infrastructural projects as well.

Reference 2 - 0.17% Coverage

This seems to indicate that the processes around Chinese aid are not static and in many respects depend upon the desires and strategies of recipient government leaders in negotiating good development outcomes for their communities.

Reference 3 - 0.14% Coverage

he largest Chinese investment is the US$1.4 billion Ramu nickel and cobalt mine project in Madang Province. Here, too, we see the Chinese aid and investment relationship at play. This is a commercial

Reference 4 - 0.32% Coverage

contract signed at the very top political level, undertaken by a Chinese state-owned enterprise, and supported – to a certain extent – by the Chinese Embassy in Port Moresby; it includes a key road in the mine area being funded through a Chinese Government aid grant10 and reports of villagers from “mine affected communities” receiving scholarships and training opportunities under Chinese Government aid grants (Interview SP041, 13 October 2009)

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2013 China’s agricultural and rural development engagement in Africa - § 2 references coded [ 0.47% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.14% Coverage

China has also experimented with new methods of combining aid and economic cooperation, such as joint ventures, cooperation contracts, and public-private partnerships

Reference 2 - 0.33% Coverage

Exchange has also featured prominently in China’s agricultural cooperation with aid, as China has already sent 40,000 and in 2012 founded the African Talents Program. China has also offered some African countries agricultural assistance in the forms of vocational training, South-South cooperation through the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and rural roads (Brautigam, 2012a).

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2013 Marian Urbina Social policy in the context of new global actors- How far is China’s developmental model in Africa impacting traditional donors~ - § 8 references coded [ 2.31% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.16% Coverage

2008). Most notably, the Chinese approach seems firmly located within a broader developmental welfare model, now characteristic of welfare systems in several East Asian countries (Gough et al.,

Reference 2 - 0.19% Coverage

hina has established much stronger and explicit links between development aid and economic activities than most Western donors and assistance is normally implemented through specific projects rather than broader programmes or policies.

Reference 3 - 0.22% Coverage

Though there is some attention on the development of human resources and capacity building in the form of scholarships and training,8 Beijing still has a preference for large-scale infrastructure projects such as hospitals, government offices, railroads and power plants

Reference 4 - 0.46% Coverage

China mostly prioritizes the provision of social assistance through bilateral mechanisms, the Forum of China–Africa Cooperation was established as a platform for collective consultation and dialogue between the Chinese government and African countries and to formalize long-term relationships. While the added value of FOCAC beyond its symbolism has been questioned (Taylor, 2011), Chinese and African counterparts continue using FOCAC summits to reappraise current agreements, identify new resources and modalities of cooperation, and negotiate new aid commitments.

Reference 5 - 0.49% Coverage

targeted pro-poor interventions such as transfers of cash, food or assets or targeted social services are largely absent from Chinese aid packages in Africa and most   
268 Global Social Policy 13(3)   
efforts of the Chinese government do not promote social policy assistance directed at income poverty and social exclusion. Documents refer to the need to attain a more ‘just and equitable’ international order rather than specific ‘welfarist’ interventions targeting vulnerable groups. Development interventions thus seek to enhance the social wellbeing of the whole population rather than individual members

Reference 6 - 0.30% Coverage

In contrast, China’s educational assistance focuses more on the tertiary level; on building universities and providing scholarships to African students to complete vocational and technical education in Chinese universities. Similarly, in health care, China directly provides health services through building hospitals, health centres and supplying medical teams.

Reference 7 - 0.20% Coverage

Chinese interviewees argued not only that social and economic development are inextricably linked but that economic development is a condition for achieving social progress: ‘The first stage should be economic development and later social development.

Reference 8 - 0.30% Coverage

Beijing appears to be guided by a social development approach which re-establishes stronger links between the economic and social dimensions of development. It is embedded in a rationale which posits that poverty reduction and social development are ultimately secured by productive activities which contribute to economic development and employment opportunities.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2013 Varrall Chinese Views on China’s Role in International Dev - § 3 references coded [ 0.57% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.12% Coverage

State management of resources was a key factor of its modernization and development program, which is proudly noted to have lifted over 500 million people out of poverty over the past few decades.

Reference 2 - 0.19% Coverage

This perspective reflects widely shared developmentalist notions that economic development is the primary means of establishing political legitimacy, understood as the essential prerequisite for the stable political, economic and social environment necessary for continued growth and development.

Reference 3 - 0.25% Coverage

While Chinese aid does not use partner country or regional strategies to plan out development cooperation, it is a   
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Chinese Views on International Development Assistance   
point of pride that Chinese development projects respond to the requests of partner governments.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2013 Warmerdam Having, Giving, Taking Lessons on Ownership in Ch - § 2 references coded [ 0.31% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.14% Coverage

China’s aid programme does not provide budget support, and is not involved in governance reform-related aid. Its assistance is more focused on infrastructure, and its engagement also stimulates the private sector.

Reference 2 - 0.17% Coverage

China’s foreign aid is considered demand-driven (Unsworth, 2010; Wood et al., 2008).9 This contrasts with traditional donor supplydriven project aid. Sector and budget support were introduced to overcome problems associated this supply-driven project aid.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2014 Foreign Aid and Development in Sino-African Relations - § 2 references coded [ 0.41% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.15% Coverage

Over the past 50 years, China’s foreign aid to Africa has sponsored more than 900 infrastructure and social development projects,26   
although   
often financed on the condition that they are carried out by Chinese companies

Reference 2 - 0.26% Coverage

or Information Communication Technology (ICT) sector, China’s involvement in Africa mainly takes the form of equipment sales to African countries, either through normal commercial contracts or through intergovernmental financing tied to purchases of Chinese equipment by state-owned telecom incumbents. An important focus has been the development of national backbone infrastructure.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2014 The forum on China-Africa Cooperation,Ideas and Aid National Interest or Strategic Partnership - § 1 reference coded [ 0.26% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.26% Coverage

Fifth, China is in favour of the speedy completion of projects that would give way to quicker returns in terms of income and capital for the recipient states. Sixth, China guarantees to supply recipient countries with top quality equipment and materials fabricated in China at international prices.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2014 Towards a critical geopolitics of China’s engagement with African development - § 1 reference coded [ 0.05% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.05% Coverage

In concrete terms the blurring of aid, investment and development is realised through the mechanisms for funding projects.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2016 Dennis D. Institutional Mismatch and Chinese in the Philippines Challenges and Opportunities - § 6 references coded [ 1.20% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.32% Coverage

Other attractions of Chinese aid as pointed out in one study are   
the relative swiftness of its delivery, its allotment to sectors that are neglected or ignored by other donors, and the financing of tangible public works of national significance (Lum et al. 2009). Unlike DAC aid, which is generally allotted more to social sectors, the allure of Chinese aid is enhanced by aligning it with recipients’ demand for infrastructure development.

Reference 2 - 0.23% Coverage

China follows a different approach in project identification, which often involves   
302 Institutional Mismatch and Chinese Aid in the Philippines   
Chinese businesses, awards contracts and aid-assisted projects exclusively to Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and maintains higher ratios of tied assistance.

Reference 3 - 0.20% Coverage

Although China’s SOEs are not officially part of the aid man-   
agement system, Cheng, Fang, and Lien (2012) note that they have become increasingly influential in shaping foreign aid policy, particularly in the construction, information technology, and mining sectors.

Reference 4 - 0.17% Coverage

The Chinese aid system follows the principle of request-based aid, which means that loans or grants are provided based on the official requests of the recipient government, which are submitted through diplomatic and other channels.

Reference 5 - 0.17% Coverage

Unlike traditional donors, which conduct a series of formal   
and informal policy dialogues between aid agencies and their counterparts in recipient countries, project proposals are typically initiated by Chinese companies.

Reference 6 - 0.12% Coverage

In the Philippines, Chinese SOEs approach implementing agencies and introduce proposals with supply contract and financing support from the China EXIM Bank

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2016 Domestic actors and agendas in Chinese aid policy - § 37 references coded [ 8.72% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.42% Coverage

this paper suggests that a complex web of government and non-government actors exists at state, provincial, and local levels, jostling for space and inﬂuence over foreign aid policy. These actors have interests and agendas that are often non-complementary, if not outright contradictory, resulting in considerable debate about how to best conceptualise and deliver aid. Vagueness of policy direction from higher levels enhances the space for the multiple actors engaged in China’s overseas assistance to interpret directives according to their own agendas and mandates (Corkin 2011a: 63).

Reference 2 - 0.14% Coverage

nﬂuential individuals across the whole scope of aid policy and implementation also play a key role in decision-making that is not reﬂected in ofﬁcial ﬂowcharts, at times outside the formal processes.

Reference 3 - 0.31% Coverage

Chinese policy-makers and commentators continue to regularly refer to   
these guidelines as the basis of Chinese overseas assistance (interviews with Chinese aid actors, China and overseas, 20102013). However, broad space to determine what these principles mean in practice has resulted in various aid actors creating their own policy agendas and pursuing their own interests with little regard for the agendas of other actors.

Reference 4 - 0.12% Coverage

Over 90 per cent of the bilateral aid funding allocated by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) is managed by MOFCOM’s Department of Foreign Aid (DFA), with about 70 ofﬁcials.

Reference 5 - 0.12% Coverage

MOFCOM and MFA do not share the same views around   
the purpose of the Eximbank concessional loans, a key part of China’s ofﬁcial development assistance (Corkin 2011a: 73).

Reference 6 - 0.09% Coverage

Eximbank’s approach to international development seems to be much more aligned with MOFCOM’s largely commercial agenda.

Reference 7 - 0.15% Coverage

Additionally, MOFCOM ofﬁcials explained to me on a number of occasions that the two ofﬁces do not readily exchange information, as they are working for ministries that may be competing for inﬂuence in Beijing (

Reference 8 - 0.07% Coverage

A number of MOFCOM ofﬁcials have also been involved in second-   
ments to international organisations.

Reference 9 - 0.19% Coverage

Through my conversations with Chinese government ofﬁcials, it is clear that MFA understands aid as a tool by which China can strengthen its bilateral diplomatic relations with aid-recipient countries, and enhance China’s international reputation more generally.

Reference 10 - 0.15% Coverage

Through its Africa Desk, the MFA is ofﬁcially responsible for foreign policy implementation. It also ‘oversees and coordinates policies on and cooperation and exchanges with relevant countries and regio

Reference 11 - 0.20% Coverage

In Chinese foreign aid today, the MFA plays a secondary role to MOF-   
COM. In the past, MFA played a greater role in foreign aid policy than it does today. Even a little over a decade ago, MFA was considered by some to be the most important agency in foreign policy-making (Zhao 1992;Lu 2000).

Reference 12 - 0.09% Coverage

As he said, ‘MOFCOM and MFA always quarrel about whether China should do trilateral cooperation with developed countries’.

Reference 13 - 0.43% Coverage

MFA believed that trilateral cooperation provided an opportunity to balance otherwise troubled bilateral relations with developed countries, such as the United States. MOFCOM, however, saw bilateral cooperation as a far more efﬁcient way to implement aid  efﬁcient meaning meeting the expectations of the other country’s government ofﬁcials to deliver on time and to budget. As he explained it to me, this efﬁciency focus was designed to provide immediate political beneﬁts for China, but could sometimes cause later diplomatic problems, if the project did not consider longterm sustainability issues.

Reference 14 - 0.55% Coverage

. Initially reluctant to engage in any discussions or take any position on the post-2015 development agenda, over the course of 2013, MFA has   
M. Varrall: Domestic Actors and Agendas in Chinese Aid Policy 31   
become far more receptive to the idea that without China’s active participation, any global framework will be partial at best (Conversation with UNDP China employee, November 2013). Similar conversations with MOFCOM have not been so fruitful. In interactions with MOFCOM on the matter, the Ministry maintains the line that MFA also formerly held  that the best way for China to support global development is to continue to develop itself. This suggests that MFA is conscious of China’s strategic role in global development in a way that MOFCOM as yet does not prioritise.

Reference 15 - 0.18% Coverage

As my contact formerly of MOFCOM told me, MoF just ﬁghts to keep costs down, but apart from that, it has no strong views about which countries or projects should be focused on, ‘just spending less money’ (Interview with former government ofﬁcial, January 2014)

Reference 16 - 0.34% Coverage

The State Council is ofﬁcially responsible for determining high-level guidelines, and when necessary, can act as ﬁnal arbiter in disputes between agencies over aid policy and implementation. The State Council ultimately approves Chinese aid policy, after being drafted by the agency responsible for its management, for example, MOFCOM or MOST. The State Council also makes the ﬁnal decision on Eximbank concessional loans valued at over USD50 million (Freeman 2008).

Reference 17 - 0.32% Coverage

The State Council is also responsible for the publication of the White   
Paper on Foreign Aid, although the Paper is drafted by MOFCOM. The State Council decides what the overall guidelines on the content of the White Paper will be, for example, whether it will focus on principles, concrete activities over the past years, or plans for the future. It is also the State Council that decides what classiﬁcation aid data has, for the most part top secret.

Reference 18 - 0.17% Coverage

While the State Council ofﬁcially has the responsibility for the overall direction of Chinese policy, the Chinese Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) holds more weight than any of the administrative institutions.

Reference 19 - 0.28% Coverage

The MoF is technically ‘responsible for formulating policies and plans, drawing up the framework agreement to be signed, and determining the interest rate of the loan’, but in practice, MOFCOM and Eximbank undertake the bulk of these responsibilities, and MoF is only required to sign off on the budget. The loans are managed by MOFCOM, sometimes in conjunction with MFA (Corkin 2011a: 71).

Reference 20 - 0.53% Coverage

n addition to concessional loans, Eximbank also provides ﬁnancing packages including export buyer’s credits (for a borrowing country) and export seller’s credits (short-term credits for a Chinese company). These can sometimes be offered together for a speciﬁc project, alongside concessional loans, as part of an overall development ﬁnancing package. However, these credits are not considered part of the aid programme (UNDP 2013b: 2). Despite the close administrative alignment with MOFCOM’s aid pro-   
gramme, the extent to which Eximbank loans are focused on development outcomes beyond short-term increases in employment and economic growth is debatable as the detailed guidelines on which Eximbank bases its decisions are not available

Reference 21 - 0.16% Coverage

While Eximbank concessional loans are considered to be part of China’s   
ofﬁcial foreign aid programme, administered and subsidised by MOFCOM, the de facto functional relationship between MOFCOM and Eximbank is unclear

Reference 22 - 0.13% Coverage

Eximbank is very active in Africa, including disbursing loans agreed to at high-level FOCAC summits, MFA plays a marginal role, if any, in Eximbank’s concessional loan processes.

Reference 23 - 0.12% Coverage

MOFCOM ofﬁcial, I was told that Eximbank is far less concerned about the developmental beneﬁts or diplomatic impacts of its loans than whether or not it can get its money bac

Reference 24 - 0.28% Coverage

While Eximbank’s formal role is policy-oriented development ﬁnancing, its mandate is to provide opportunities for ‘mutual beneﬁts’ for Chinese companies as well as generating ‘social beneﬁts’ for local actors. Eximbank’s dual purpose results in its activities adding to the tension between the simultaneous pursuit of foreign policy objectives and commercial gain in Chinese foreign aid.

Reference 25 - 0.28% Coverage

CAITEC, attached to the Ministry of Commerce, provides policy research directly to MOFCOM’s DFA. Indeed, CAITEC ofﬁcials are often working on secondment within MOFCOM. These close connections to the Chinese Government means that international actors looking for an opportunity to inﬂuence China’s overseas aid are vying to work with actors like Professor Li and CAITEC researchers.

Reference 26 - 0.35% Coverage

CAITEC ofﬁcials have also been involved in secondments, for example, a junior-level CAITEC researcher was seconded to the German aid agency headquarters for four months in 2012, followed by a two-month placement at Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris. CAITEC has also approached multilateral donors such as UNDP and traditional bilateral donors in Beijing to ask for research and policy inputs into topics currently under consideration in MOFCOM.

Reference 27 - 0.18% Coverage

This interest in collaboration, cooperation, and discussion among some   
non-government and semi-government actors reiterates how much the topic of China’s foreign aid is currently under discussion and review in China’s policy-making circles.

Reference 28 - 0.19% Coverage

Another important set of players in Chinese foreign aid are private businesses and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). They play a role in Chinese aid as it is common for aspects of bilateral project implementation to be contracted out to Chinese SOEs or private enterprises.

Reference 29 - 0.34% Coverage

Chinese SOEs, particularly construction and oil companies, are   
renowned for being competitive and pursuing their own agendas. However, they tend to be closed to public scrutiny, and for the most part, outsiders   
38 The Paciﬁc Review   
can only guess at what those agendas may be. Large SOEs in some cases have high bureaucratic rankings, including vice-ministerial level, which means that Chinese embassies in partner countries have little ability to control their activities.

Reference 30 - 0.34% Coverage

n addition, Chinese enterprises reportedly take advantage of the confusion in aid recipient countries about MOFCOM and MFA’s roles, and play off the rivalry between the two ministries for their own advantage. Rivalry between MFA and MOFCOM was said to have caused tensions in negotiations in Angola in the early 2000s, where Chinese construction companies worked through Angolan power brokers rather than the ofﬁcial ministry contacts to push their own agendas (Corkin 2011a: 82).

Reference 31 - 0.17% Coverage

s for SOEs, these private companies can be contracted to undertake building work for Chinese foreign aid projects, and like SOEs, they are by deﬁnition likely to be motivated by commercial interests rather than local development outcomes.

Reference 32 - 0.16% Coverage

Despite this, these entities are frequently perceived by outside commentators as being representatives of ofﬁcial Chinese policy, often resulting in misunderstandings as to China’s aid motivations and modalities.

Reference 33 - 0.11% Coverage

the various provincial-level governments, many of which run small aid programmes from their own budgets, which tends to largely consist of in-kind assistance

Reference 34 - 0.28% Coverage

An analysis of the institutional structures in Chinese foreign aid demon-   
strates that rather than it following any single, top-down strategic direction, there is little to no overarching guidance beyond general principles. As a result, the multiple Chinese actors engaging in foreign aid develop policies and act in ways that are inconsistent with other actors, if not contradictory.

Reference 35 - 0.30% Coverage

MOFCOM, the agency for bilateral aid, is largely focused on commercial issues, and has little to no interest in diplomatic affairs. The small team in MOFCOM’s Department of Foreign Affairs responsible for bilateral aid has no capacity to delve into areas outside its immediate mandate. MFA is responsible for diplomatic affairs and is interested in commercial concerns only insofar as they have a political impact.

Reference 36 - 0.31% Coverage

The commercial imperative behind MOFCOM and Eximbank’s focus on commercial gains and continuing aid relations with countries shunned by much of the international community has meant that China has more than once been the object of severe criticism (Naim 2007). Ignoring MFA’s concerns around the reputational implications has resulted in a raft of diplomatic challenges that MFA continues to have to attempt to solve (Corkin 2011a: 74).

Reference 37 - 0.19% Coverage

The different agencies’ pursuit of often competing agendas results in what some describe as ‘diplomatic   
40 The Paciﬁc Review   
schizophrenia’ (Corkin 2011a: 76), as the different agencies pursuing competing agendas result in what appears to be contradictory policies.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2016 Marica Don China’s Coherence in International Eonomic Governance - § 3 references coded [ 0.25% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.07% Coverage

, China’s aid is not a ‘one type fits all’ model, rather it is geared to the specific needs and requests of the recipient countries.

Reference 2 - 0.09% Coverage

Moreover, the Chinese funded projects focus on infrastructure, education, and manufacturing, rather than on the political and economic reform agenda of the traditional donors (

Reference 3 - 0.08% Coverage

China’s aid is based on the principles of its own model of development - start with economic development, and then, worry about other areas such as environment.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Kishi Chinese Official Finance and State Repression in A - § 1 reference coded [ 0.17% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.17% Coverage

While Western donors tend to develop country-specific strategies, China’s official finance programs are based on high-level discussions, which has the effect of feeding ‘prestige’ products and/or patronage flows, since it is not tied to specific outcomes to the degree other donors are (Brautigam, 2011a).

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Palina Prysmakova Chinese Intergovernmental Relations and World Development - § 3 references coded [ 0.40% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.10% Coverage

Chinese export credits resolve a latent conflict of interests between the central and local governments by transferring Chinese businesses abroad.

Reference 2 - 0.15% Coverage

the leading forces of booming Chinese investments originate neither from Beijing nor from the private sector. They are the initiatives of the local governments, which benefit the most from the overseas projects.

Reference 3 - 0.15% Coverage

hey are Chinese local governments and companies from those localities that request the central authorities to open credit lines for their overseas projects. Similar to investments in Africa (Henderson et al., 2013),

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2018 Kassaye Deyassa Does China’s Aid in Africa Affect Traditional Donors - § 7 references coded [ 1.63% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.39% Coverage

China has made much stronger and more explicit links between development aid and economic activity than most Western donors. The aid is usually implemented through specific projects rather than broader programs or policies. Unlike traditional donors, Chinese aid is usually provided in the form of Chinese workers who build roads or hospitals instead of providing financial resources.

Reference 2 - 0.46% Coverage

Targeted interventions in favour of the poor, such as transfer of cash, food or assets or targeted social services, are mostly non-existent in the Chinese aid packages in Africa, and most of the Chinese government’s efforts do not support social policy support aimed at income poverty and social exclusion. The documents refer to the need to achieve a fairer and fairer international order, rather than taking targeted interventions aimed at disadvantaged groups.

Reference 3 - 0.25% Coverage

In contrast, China’s educational assistance focuses more on tertiary educa-   
tion, such as the construction of universities and the granting of scholarships to African students to complete vocational and technical training at Chinese universities.

Reference 4 - 0.06% Coverage

China’s strategy underlines instrumental motivations.

Reference 5 - 0.10% Coverage

Most health cooperation has focused at the implementation level rather than at the policy level.

Reference 6 - 0.16% Coverage

Documents and interviews repeatedly show that China’s aid, trade and investment for Africa are intertwined in an integrated package and cannot be easily separated

Reference 7 - 0.21% Coverage

It is embedded in a rationale stating that poverty reduction and social development are ultimately ensured through productive activities that contribute to economic development and employment opportunities.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Kinyondo Is China Recolonizing Africa Some Views from Tanz - § 2 references coded [ 0.22% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.17% Coverage

A good example is seen in Ghana where negotiations with the WB to build a dam stalled for about seven years. When the Ghanaian government decided to engage China, it merely took two months for the deal to be settled. Project implementation started a month later (Wharton University of Pennsylvania 2016).

Reference 2 - 0.05% Coverage

Chinese firms seem to also have a competitive edge over those from traditional DPs.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Pippa Morgan Can China’s Economic Statecraft Win Soft Power in Africa - § 4 references coded [ 0.52% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.34% Coverage

China’s foreign aid projects and large-scale investments in infrastructure and resources are typically carried out by major state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with strong state linkages and on-theground oversight from Chinese Embassies and Economic and Commercial Counselor (ECC) offices. Even though the companies serving as aid contractors or making large-scale investments are also commercial actors, their greater oversight means they are more accountable and more likely to fall in line with state goals.

Reference 2 - 0.05% Coverage

SOEs dominate investment in the resource and infrastructure sectors,16 while

Reference 3 - 0.05% Coverage

smaller scale private sector businesses dominate in manufacturing and services.

Reference 4 - 0.08% Coverage

SOEs carrying out aid projects are closely connected to and well-monitored by China’s bureaucracies and policy banks.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Pippa Morgan Old bottle new wine The evolution of China’s aid in Africa from 1965-2014 - § 16 references coded [ 5.89% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.24% Coverage

irst, the ‘Chinese model’ that mixes conventional Overseas Development Assistance (ODA)-like types of aid and other economic engagement is a surprisingly recent development. In line with China’s gradualist approach to wider reforms, China’s post-Mao aid policy reforms were piecemeal and experiential.

Reference 2 - 0.67% Coverage

Paradoxically, the traditional Chinese aid policy was in some respects more similar to that of conventional DAC donors, despite China’s relative isolation for much of this period. Prior to the mid-1990s, China, despite its relative poverty, did not appear to seek substantive economic benefits from its aid. However, since the late 1990s, a distinct ‘Chinese model’ which combines ODA-like aid with commercial flows has emerged. Second, social sectors such as health and education have played a greater role in China’s   
aid programme than is commonly perceived. The health sector accounted for the largest proportion of projects for the entire observation period between 1956 and 2014. Moreover, Chinese aid in social sectors has displayed remarkable continuity over time, with Mao era blueprints of Chinese medical teams and government scholarships persisting to this day.

Reference 3 - 0.24% Coverage

With the emergence of the   
post-1990s ‘Chinese model’ of mixing aid with commercial finance, Chinese aid to industry and other business-focused sectors has not only increased dramatically, but also changed its forms substantially; yet aid to social sectors has remained remarkably consistent across time

Reference 4 - 0.31% Coverage

Health was also a key sector, and medical teams were the primary form of health aid. The   
first Chinese medical team to Africa left Beijing for Algeria in April 1963. This group of 23 doctors, translators and support staff from central China’s Hubei province spent two years in Algeria delivering medical care. During the 1960s, China dispatched similar medical teams to five other African countries.3

Reference 5 - 0.59% Coverage

Scholarships for African students to study in Chinese universities were typically granted   
as part of broader bilateral agreements on Cultural Cooperation, sometimes on a reciprocal basis. With the exception of a brief suspension between 1966 and 1971 due to the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government has consistently provided scholarships for students from African states (and other developing countries),33 and our data set records 37 agreements in total to provide scholarships for African students. During the 1960s China introduced the ‘turnkey’ model, in which China provides all aspects   
of constructing a project (including some of the workforce), paid for by a grant or loan, and turns the ‘keys’ over to the recipient once the project is complete

Reference 6 - 0.50% Coverage

Nevertheless, despite the rising importance of non ODA-like official finance, and contrary to popular perceptions, social sectors remain important. The health sector occupied 23% of recorded African projects between 1995 and 2014, and the education sector 12%. Their blueprints have changed little since the Mao era. With the caveat that the financial value of projects in social sectors is in general likely to be lower than in productive sectors, so they are likely to occupy a smaller proportion of the overall budget, the data indicate that these sectors are an important part of China’s aid programme and potentially have substantive effects.

Reference 7 - 0.22% Coverage

likewise, although China’s educational aid has diversified, most visibly with the Confucius   
Institute programme (China’s first African Confucius Institute was launched in 2005, in Nairobi, Kenya), the blueprint for Chinese government scholarships has remained consistent.

Reference 8 - 0.31% Coverage

or example, China’s 2009 Cultural Cooperation agreement providing for the granting of scholarships to Kenya is very similar to the first one signed between the two countries in 1982. The Chinese Government Scholarship programme first initiated during the Mao era remains a significant source of aid to Africa,51 with 5500 scholarships pledged for Africa students to study in Chinese universities in 2012.52

Reference 9 - 0.66% Coverage

ince the mid-1990s, DAC aid has converged around tackling poverty and meeting social   
and environmental goals.55 The main source of divergence between the Chinese and contemporary OECD aid models is found in China’s finance for infrastructure and productive sectors (including agriculture), which are relatively small in terms of project numbers, but are large in size and attract the most attention. While conventional ODA-like aid dominates social sectors, only half of recorded official Chinese projects in the industry, mining and construction sector between 1994 and 2014 in Africa were classified as ODA-like, with the rest being official investments or other types of primarily commercially-oriented official finance. In the transport sector (which includes China’s road and railway projects), the proportion of ODA-like projects was less than 60%.

Reference 10 - 0.23% Coverage

In productive sectors, China’s aid blueprints have been updated to reflect its new approach   
that mixes traditional ODA-like aid with other types of finance. For example, China continues to provide agricultural demonstration stations staffed by experts who aim to transfer agricultural technologies.

Reference 11 - 0.22% Coverage

However, since the turn of the century, Chinese agro-technical demonstration stations have begun to experiment with modern public–private financing mechanisms that mix government backing, the expertise of Chinese agricultural research centres and agricultural companies.

Reference 12 - 0.31% Coverage

Instead of being funded through grants or interest-free loans, many turnkey projects are now funded through concessional loans from China’s EXIM bank, market loans from China Development Bank and/or Chinese commercial banks, state-sponsored investments, or a combination thereof, with China’s profit-oriented State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) serving as contractors in project implementation

Reference 13 - 0.64% Coverage

hinese aid in the health and education sectors has proven remarkably consistent over   
time. With a gap from 1979 to 1984 due to the Ethiopian civil war, China has dispatched medical teams from Henan, and up to 2017, China has sent 19 teams involving 327 volunteers, with the latest 16-member team serving at Tirunesh Beijing General Hospital (TBGH), a new facility completed in 2012 with Chinese finance.63 likewise, China has continued to offer scholarships for Ethiopian students, educating 69 Ethiopian students between 1970 and 2002. In 2016, Chinese government scholarships were offered to 26 Ethiopian postgraduate students.64 However, the proportional share of China’s medical and educational aid has declined; since the late 1990s, China has dramatically increased and diversified the funds available for productive sectors.

Reference 14 - 0.22% Coverage

Chinese aid in industry, infrastructure and   
other productive sectors in Ethiopia has undergone significant changes in the past two decades, in which a new ‘Chinese model’ of assistance has emerged that differs significantly from China’s old aid model and the models of OECD donors

Reference 15 - 0.30% Coverage

Chinese funding for the railroad was given in a combination of concessional loans from China’s EXIM bank, and loans at commercial rates from the CDB and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). Two SOEs, the China Railway Group and the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation, constructed the railroad and will manage operations for the first few years after opening.

Reference 16 - 0.23% Coverage

Our fieldwork indicated that China’s modern official finance projects support and attract   
private investment. Manufacturing investors cite Ethiopia’s improving infrastructure, of which China is the major funder, as a major reason for their positivity about Ethiopia’s long term investment outlook.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Seven decades of Chinese state financingin Africa - § 1 reference coded [ 0.28% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.28% Coverage

China’s government has consistently been willing to ﬁnance major transportation, power generation, and other infrastructure projects that serve as ‘building blocks’ of development, often in precarious political and geographic environments. China is relatively unique in this regard, given other bilateral and multilateral donors’ growing reluctance to ﬁnance these projects (Dollar 2008).